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The paper deals with the effects of government policy promoting
basic research as an incentive to economic growth. Government is
included into a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, in which,
thanks to the income proceeding from proportional taxation of
monopolistic enterprises profits, it is enabled to carry out basic
research activities which match applied research carried out by
private enterprises. The results obtained show how it is possible that
government determine a taxation level able to optimize economic
growth. The effectiveness will be determined by the market. In
particular, high competition levels make government policy less
effective. [JEL Classification: 031, 038, 040]
1. - Introduction
The object of the present paper is to assess the role and
effectiveness of basic, government-promoted research aiming at
stimulating economic growth and innovation, through the creation
of an endogenous growth model, where the growth of the general
level of knowledge is determined by both basic research and
applied research.
Basic research has always been given little importance within
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mistakes are attributable to the Author.endogenous growth theory. As emerging from a review of current
literature on public research, it can be seen that only a small
number of authors has dealt with the subject in a macroeconomic
context
1.
Among the economic scientists making a distinction between
basic research and applied research are to be mentioned Aghion
and Howitt (1996), who contribute a heterogeneity feature to a
Schumpeterian growth model. These authors distinguish between
innovative activities producing “fundamental knowledge”, the kind
of knowledge able to determine new opportunities but not to
produce new processes and products; and the development
producive of “secondary knowledge”, which allows the new
opportunities to be accomplished. A few years later, David (2000)
discussed the issue of “open science” devoting his interests in
particular on the distinction between the two types of research.
His analysis focused on the market ability to provide basic
research of a good level. The author, although interested in finding
out which could be the correct policy for government research
activities, dealt extensively with the externalities of basic research
on industrial research. A similar diversification is also present in
Morales (2004) who analyzed the effects of the different types of
research on economic growth. On the subject of externalities
between basic research and applied research are also to be
mentioned Grossman and Helpmann (1991) who devoted to the
subject a section of the introductory chapters of their work.
The second feature which is going to be dealt with in this pa-
per concerns the role of the government in the field of research.
Also with respect to this area, literature presents some gaps. The
subject is generally dealt with in the perspective of the analysis
of industrial organization and for this reason the existing works
concentrate on the microeconomic effects of aids to research and
patent policy. Nonetheless, for the aims of the present paper some
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1 The distinction between basic research and applied research is a necessary
one in each economic policy choice concerning this subject. In order to understand,
for example, the way in which growth can be enhanced by a subsidy policy, it will
be necessary to assess, first of all, which between basic research and applied
research is best favoured as regarding subsidies.of these works are worth mentioning, such as Mamuneas and
Nadiri (1996); Ham and Movery (1998) and Mamuneas (1999) as
they provide a microeconomic grounding to the hypothesis of pub-
lic research implying positive externalities on private productivi-
ty.
Among the authors that consider instead public research from
a macroeconomic point of view can be mentioned Glomm and
Ravikumar (1994) who introduced a model where economic
growth is determined by public research. The above mentioned
work evidenced however distributional problems and, in such a
context, the role of public research was limited to procure
endogenous technological innovations, thus avoiding the need to
resort to a private research and development sector. Pelloni (1997)
analysed the hypothesis that government investments in basic
research increase economy growth performance, excluding the
same results for private research. Park (1998) included public
research (both basic and applied) in the model of Romer (1990).
He assumed that public research indirectly contributed to
economic growth because of the positive externalities on the
accumulation of knowledge in the private sector. Anyway, the work
was less focused on public research policy than on the spillover
of research.
Our work, whose aim is that of enlarging Aghion and Howitt
model (1998) with the inclusion of government founded basic
research, can be placed in the framework just outlined. Our paper
features a model in which economic growth is provided by research
activity, both basic and applied. Private enterprises invest in applied
research projects which are likely to lead to new products or new
production technologies. If the above said research projects are
successful, the promoting enterprise appropriates all monopoly
profits in the production of its own sector intermediate good. With
every innovation, the general level of knowledge is also likely to
expand, which is the basis of new research projects. Basic research,
on the other hand, is carried out by government, which will devote
to it the whole internal revenue obtained through proportional
taxation of monopolistic enterprises profits. We posit comple-
mentarity between basic and applied research; for this reason there
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enterprise innovation. However, the spillovers are not of a direct
kind. The knowledge introduced by basic research has no effects
on the likeliness on new discoveries, but it has on the production
parameter of innovations.
There are three relevant types of interaction between basic
research and applied research. They are complementarity,
replaceability and a third form which is a mix of the former two.
Complementarity is treated extensively in the specific literature.
Among the authors mentioned, such a view is present in the works
of Aghion and Howitt (1996); Park (1998) and David (2000).
According to this scheme, the two research types have positive
effects on each other. High levels of basic research are likely to
determine a growth in applied research productivity, as they allow
the researchers operating in the latter sector an adaptation of the
innovations achieved in the former sector. A highly innovating
economy is also more stimulating for basic research.
Complementarity is not completely accepted in the literature, as
some empirical studies have shown how there is a paradox in the
interaction of basic research and applied research. Namely, although
it is an opinion commonly held that in the long run basic knowledge
is a critical element in turning applied research into a profitable
investment for enterprises, in the short period length a form of
replaceability can be noticed between the two types of research.
Limitation in resources often results in promoting basic research to
the detriment of applied research
2. In order to asses such a feature,
Morales (2004) employs a model that includes both complementarity
and replaceability between enterprises. Quite infrequent are instead
the articles posing complete replaceability between the two types of
research. Our paper posits complementarity between the two types.
The results obtained are nonetheless similar to those obtained by
Morales (2004), which shows a short-lived replaceability degree
between the two research types.
The results achieved can be divided into effects on the growth
rate and effects on applied research. As for the former, our model
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2 DAVID P.A. (2000).shows that the government can finance basic research by imple-
menting a tax rate which maximize economy growth rate. With
reference to applied research, it emerges that its productivity
grows discontinuously as basic research increases. Namely, things
being equal, tax increase by the government, resulting in an
increase of basic research, determines a decrease in the number
of researchers employed in the sector of applied research. This
happens because taxation influences directly and proportionally
monopoly profits of the innovated companies. In this way, taxes
reduce the spur to applied research by companies.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In the
second section is introduced the model and are illustrated its main
features. In the third section are introduced analytic results and is
explained their meaning from an economic point of view. In the
fourth section a numeric simulation is carried out in order to analyze
the performance of the growth rate of economy as the model
parameters change. This procedure will also make possible to assess
the optimal taxation level. The final section contains the conclusions.
2. - The Model
The model of Aghion and Howitt, in its very first version
3, quite
stylized under some respects, featured some interesting results that
have largely influenced subsequent analysis. In the first place, it
retrieved some Schumpeterian insights and placed them in a model
in which growth is generated by a casual succession of vertical
innovations (i.e. innovations determining a rise in the quality of
products), due, in their turn, to a research activity characterized by
doubtful results. Within the model was also retrieved the concept
of creative destruction. Namely, the authors took into consideration
a kind of vertical innovation characterized by the fact that
innovations make old technologies or old products obsolete. Such
obsolescence involves the existence of a single steady-state equi-
librium and the opportunity of a cyclical growth. The latter is a
consequence of the negative relationship between current and future
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3 AGHION P. - HOWITT P.  (1992).research. Innovation, in fact, beyond implying positive externalities
on future research and development, grants negative externalities
for current producers (business-stealing effect).
In Aghion and Howitt (1998) the authors introduced two
important new features concerning both the possibility to produce
the final good by employing a large variety of intermediate goods
and the introduction of accumulation of physical capital. The
resulting model is a hybrid one that can be interpreted either as
a Schumpeterian model with physical capital or as a Solow model
with endogenous technological progress.
The model we are going to introduce is characterized by
features similar to those of Aghion and Howitt’s one (1998) in its
multisectoral version. Economy is populated by a mass of
individuals L with linear intertemporal preferences following the
specification:  u(y) = ∫
∞
0 yte
–rtdt, where r is both the rate of time
preference and the interest rate. Each individual is also a worker
so that the labour supply is equal to L.
Economy produces a consumer good, y, and a continuum of
intermediate goods indexed in the unit interval, xit. There are n
sectors of applied research, one for each intermediate good present
in the economy, and a government funded sector of basic research.
The amount of final good that can be produced through the
intermediate good i in the time t depends exclusively on the
amount of the intermediate good xit employed, according to the
production function:
(1) Yit = AitF(xit) = Aitxit
α
where the Ait stands for the productivity of the last generation of the
intermediate good i. Aggregate output of the final good is equal to





The price enforced by each monopolist
4 is  pit =  Ait F'(xit) =
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4 Each intermediate sector is monopolized by the firm that obtained the latest
innovation in the sector though a patent or innovation process.Aitαxit
α–1, and therefore the monopolists labour demand (and his
production
5) is equal to:
(2)
where  wt is the wage measured through consumer goods
6. The
profit is a fraction 1 – α of the incomes:
(3)
It is assumed that there is a research sector for each
intermediate good, in which companies compete in order to
establish the next generation for that intermediate good. The
innovation rate for each sector is equal to λnit, where λ is the
probability per unit of time that the event will occur now
(according to a Poisson process) and nit, is the number of
researchers involved in the sector. Although each sector success
rate is independent, all innovations stem from the same common
knowledge basin. The level of such a knowledge is represented by
the “leading-edge” technology, whose productivity parameter in the
time t is A
max
t    .
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5 The intermediate good production function follows a production function
where to a given labour unit corresponds a given product unit.
6 In equation (2),
shows that x depends on





















 who obtained the innovation to start producing in that sector
employing the leading-edge technology. The previous monopolist in
the sector, whose technology has been superseded, is then replaced
by a new one. When this happens, the technology parameter for
that sector Ait, shifts to parameter A
max
t    .
It is this latter parameter that basic research influences. Such
an assumption reflects the common belief that in a long interval
of time common knowledge cannot be enlarged if basic knowledge
does not undergo a further development.
For this reason, it is assumed that the growth rate of A
max
t     is
given by the expression:
(4)
where ψ is the intensity of discovery probability of basic research
7,
bt is the number of people employed in basic research and ln γ is
a proportionality factor.
The form of the above expression has a definite meaning. It
establishes that basic research and applied research are
complementary rather than interchangeable. Such an assumption
is clear in a sense at least. As already mentioned, it is a commonly
held opinion that a higher level of basic knowledge has a positive
influence on innovation possibilities by companies. A better
knowledge of natural laws, a greater number of starting point
ideas and better trained researchers are some of the reasons on
which such an assumption is grounded.
Less easy to understand can be why higher levels of applied
research have positive effects on basic research. However,
considering that an economy with a strong tendency to innovate
is undoubtedly a dynamic economy, it is understandable that basic









max ln =λ ψ γ
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7 It is taken for granted that the present phenomenon can be also modelled
like a Poisson model.
8 Complementarity between basic research and applied research is well
documented in the specific literature. Among the others, it is discussed in the
works by AGHION P. - HOWITT P.  (1996); PARK W.G. (1998) and DAVID P.A. (2000).In each given time there is a distribution of the technological
parameters of the various sectors, Ait, that can have values between
zero and A
max
t  . That distribution is not constant, as the most
innovating sectors shift towards A
max
t    , the level reached by the last
innovated sector. In spite of this, the form of distribution must
not change, although the sectors occupying the various positions
of the distribution change with every innovation. In practical
terms, in the long run the distribution through the various sectors
of the parameters of the consistent productivity,
is given by the distribution function:
(5)
with a ∈ [0,1], whatever the performance of the aggregate rate of
innovation over time.
Thanks to this property, technological progress produces a
uniform and proportional shift of the distribution of absolute
productivities, according to the law of motion governing the
evolution of social knowledge (equation (4)). This also represents
the growth rate of aggregate product.
As for the analysis of aggregate product and intersectoral
allocation, it must be considered that, within the model, resources
are continuously reallocated among the various sectors. Namely,
as economy is influenced by innovations at any time, wages are
always rising. This involves a gradual decrease in the profits and
the number of workers employed in the less innovating sectors.
Such a phenomenon represents a different, more gradual version
of creative destruction that can be called crowding-out effect.
Because the distribution of relative productivities is unchan-
ging, the different sectors can be grouped according to their rel-
ative productivity a rather than their index i. Now, after the in-
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211to the ratio between salary and productivity of the leading-edge
sector
it is possible to specify the labour demand function for a sector
with relative productivity a in the time t. That will be equal to:
The aggregate demand of labour can be then obtained by
multiplying such a function for the density of the sector, h(a) ≡ H'(a),
and summing over a.
In order to assess instead the number of basic researchers, it
is necessary to take into consideration government financing in
such activity. Taxes are drawn from monopolists profits, according
to a proportional rate equal to τ. The monopolist enterprises
profits in the sector i in the time t are equal to
To  obtain total profits in the time t, profits themselves have
to be classified according to salary adjusted to productivity, as
resulting from the following expression:
It is possible to sum up the profits of the single monopolist
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comes out:
whose final result is as follows:
Taxes area percentage τ of total profits and will be equal to:
As for the features according to which the model is built, the
revenue coming from monopoly taxes are entirely employed in the
research activity by the government. Research is carried out by
researchers who are paid the same wage as the researchers
employed in the private sector. Therefore, the number of workers
employed in basic research is equal to:
Having an idea of the flow of researchers involved in basic
research in the time t, it is possible to obtain the labour market
equation. The following expression shows how workers are divided
into the various sectors:
(6)
It can be seen that exists a positive relationship between the
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213workers employed in research and wages. Namely, the higher the
number of researchers, the higher the scarcity of workers in the
production sector and therefore the higher the wages. Wages
increase not only as n grows, but also as the resources used in
basic research grow, and so as τ grows.
For equilibrium to be possible, it is necessary to take into
consideration the non arbitrage equation. Analysing steady-state
equilibrium, the level of research is constant, so it is: nt ≡ n, ωt ≡
ω e bt ≡ b. Given such conditions, and considering an enterprise
which innovates in the time t, the latter will be characterized by
a technology parameter A
max
t    , until an innovation is introduced in
that sector. If the enterprise keeps its monopoly power in the time
t + s, given that wages grow at a constant rate g, the flow of profits
in the period will be A
max
t    π ~(ωe
gs).The likelihood that the enterprise
is still in activity in the time t + s, corresponds to the likelihood
that no innovation has taken place, that is to say e
–λns.Given such
premises, the value of the enterprise innovating in the time t is
given by the current expected value of the profits net of taxes by
t until infinity, discounted by interest rate r:
(7)
The non arbitrage condition of research, which determines the
level of research in the steady-state, implies that the salary is equal
to the marginal expected value of research (λVt). Dividing both
terms of equation (7) by A
max
t   the non arbitrage equation is obtained:
(8)
The non arbitrage equation shows a negative relationship
between n and ω: as the wages of those occupied in the production
increase, the number of researchers decreases. The positive and
negative trends respectively of the labour market equation and the
non arbitrage equation grant the existence and uniqueness of a
steady-state equilibrium.
ωλ π ω τ
λλ ψ γ =−
−+
∞
∫ ee d s
rn s n b s () l n () ( )
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In order to proceed to a deeper analysis of the results, the
two equations can be written as follows:
(9)
(10)
On the basis of the two formulas it is possible to assess the
main results of the model. Concerning the number of applied
researchers, the effects of government policy seem to be totally
negative. Namely, the taxation of monopoly profits influences the
main inducement to innovate by companies. Furthermore, as basic
research influences the level of technology A
max
t   , it increases the
crowding-out effect, shown by the third term in the denominator
of the non arbitrage equation. Lastly, one more effect of taxation
is the decrease in the level of x ~ (ω), that is the number of workers
employed in the sector with the leading-edge technology, which
implies, in its turn, a further reduction of monopoly profits.
For the reasons mentioned, taxation is likely to have negative
effects on the level of applied research n
9. Anyway, this is not to
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9 Following a referee comment we tried to insert a different source of revenue
(instead of tax on monopolist profits) and we studied its effects on investment in
applied research. In our model, we don’t include agents’ choices, so we can’t obtain
significant results from this attempt. We make a numerical simulation including
a proportional tax on wages in our model, and we obtain that the optimal rate of
taxes was 100%. We think that after introducing workers’ choices in the model, it
could be very interesting to study the effects of different kinds of taxation. We can
expect that taxation on all wages will produce a reduction in total labour force.
This reduction in total labour force could induce a drop in research amount and
a fall in production. Otherwise, taxation on skilled workers could bring to a shift
of labour force from research to production.say that government policy has a negative influence on the ability
of economy to innovate. Namely, as a consequence of such a
formulation of the model, if the government decided not to carry
out basic research for a given period of time, reducing the tax
rate to zero, there would be no technological progress. Such a
conclusion stems from the hypothesis of the law of knowledge
motion, according to which, in the long run, no conspicuous
increase in the common knowledge can be had if there is no
increase in the basic knowledge.
A further formulation of results is therefore necessary to
assess all the effects on the growth of economy. The whole growth
process should be studied in order to evaluate the effects on
growth rate, that is g = λnψb ln γ, but it could be enough to analyze
the performance of n · b, as the other factors do not depend on
government policy. The performance of n and b can be obtained
by the following equations:
Considering all the parameters as constants excepted τ, the
multiplication between the two factors will result in a continuous
function of τ. The function has, according to the Weierstrass
theorem, a maximum. It has been seen that such a maximum
cannot be on extremes, as the function with τ→0, from the right,
and  τ→1, from the left, is a decreasing one. This implies the
maximum must be in the middle. This outcome will be confirmed
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216The presence of a maximum shows that it exists a tax rate
value that maximises economic growth. This implies that
government policy influencing basic research can be adjusted so
as to maximize the positive effects on economic growth rate. Such
a result is a particularly relevant one as, among other things, it
is obtained through a proportional taxation of income acting
directly on private incentives to innovating. The previous works
on the same subjects had namely taken for granted that
government policy was financed through “lump-sum taxes” so as
to focus on the general effects of research on growth only. Within
the present model, where it is assumed that public research, which
is not on a competitive basis with the private one, has always
positive effects on economic growth, it has been decided to assess
how the financing of these policies, which necessarily influences
enterprises income, has consequences on total results.
Obviously, the above said effects depend in large measure on
the conditions of the country where such a policy is carried out.
Namely, as it can be seen from the model results, economic
conditions, shown by the different parameters, can make
government policy more or less effective. The analysis of what
occurs as parameters change will be carried out through a
numeric simulation in the next paragraph.
The model’s analytic difficulties do not allow to assess the
effects of government policy on social welfare. In spite of this, it
is possible to demonstrate, in any case, that the growth level
achieved through the market is other than what is considered the
optimal level for society. This is a typical consequence with this
class of models. Aghion & Howitt (1998), and Barro & Sala-i-
Martin (2002) show how in new-Schumpeterian endogenous
growth models, the outcomes achieved by the market are usually
less significant than those obtainable by making the most of
collective welfare. Such a consequence is probably due to two
sets of reasons. The first set is connected to some peculiar
features of the model, such as appropriability effect and business-
stealing effect, not related to the role of government in
stimulating basic research. The impact of the monopolistic
structure of the intermediate sector determines social welfare of
Public Funding for Basic Research, etc. P. MURRO
217a minor entity, because, unlike the social planner, to whom
innovation is always positive, a monopolist discounts his own
profits at his own expected innovation rate. Such a feature
reduces the amount of the research in case of laissez-faire. The
second reason is instead closely connected to the hypothesis
about the aims of government policy. It has been posited that the
government carries on basic research projects with the aim of
maximizing the growth of economy. It has to be considered,
however, that maximizing the growth do not necessarily leads to
the highest social welfare level. Namely, social utility is given not
only by economy’s innovation capacity, but also by consumption
levels. In this model, innovation takes place to the detriment of
final goods production (and therefore of consumption), so in the
short period there can be a phase of intense growth characterized
by low consumption levels. In the long run these achievements
will obviously be balanced, as growth will also act as a factor
multiplying consumption.
4. - Numeric Simulation of Results
The analytic expressions introduced show how the functions
of n and b are respectively decreasing and increasing with respect
to  τ. Their product does not have, instead, a single relationship
with respect to the tax rate. The latter will increase in an initial
stage and decrease later on. Such a feature confirms the existence
of a value of τ which maximizes the product n · b. Obviously both
the function-maximizing value of τ and the absolute level of the
product depend on the values of the parameters.
The object of the present paragraph is to assess the
assumptions just carried out on the analytic function through a
numeric simulation of the function h = f(τ) = n · b. The aim is
therefore to carry out not a quantitative analysis but rather the
assessment of the performance of the function as some parameters
change. A qualitative study is then attempted through the
theoretical simulation of the model. As it is known, in order to
carry out a simulation some values must be provided to the
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to reconsider the meaning of each one of the parameters present
in the two formulas.
Parameter α, whose variation can be between zero and one,
shows the elasticity of the demand curve that the monopolists in
the intermediate sector are to satisfy, and it also shows the level
of market competition. From the analysis of the general model it
is known that in such a context competition is without a doubt
negative for growth, as it determines a decrease both in the value
of n and b, all other conditions being the same.
The probability of an innovation occurrence in the time unit
is expressed by λ, which is therefore the probability flow of a new
discovery. This parameters can take on all values higher than zero.
The same behaviour is shown by ψ, which means the same as λ,
but referring to basic research. Parameter A
max
t    shows, in the time
t, the productivity of the sector where the last innovation has taken
place, so it reveals frontier technology. The level of population,
taken as a constant one in the model, is equal to L. The last one,
r, shows the economy interest rate, which is the same as the rate
of time preference by the agents.
Some of the parameters which simply indicate the scale of
economy have been left constant in the carrying out of the
simulation, that is γ, which has been established as equal to 1,2
and L, which has been established as equal to 100 so as to index
the results of n and b on this scale. One more parameter which
has been considered constant and which has been set equal to
0,04 is r, whose influence on the result of the model is very small.
The analysis then focused on the change showed by the remaining
four parameters.
Before considering the relationship of dependence of the func-
tion we are analyzing and the parameters values, the form of the
function can be taken into consideration. As it comes out from
each simulation, the function shows a Laffer curve trend, which
grants an internal maximum, an essential feature for the signifi-
cance of the results obtained from an economic point of view.
The data that will be used in the graphs of the function have
been obtained by simultaneously solving the two functions of n and
Public Funding for Basic Research, etc. P. MURRO
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element  τ is allowed a variance between 0 and 0.7
10. In this way
have also been obtained the values that maximize the target function.
Setting out to analyze the consequences of the change of
parameter  α on the product n · b, theory suggests that as the
elasticity of the demand the monopolist has to satisfy grows, the
propensity to research decreases. It is therefore possible to
forecast in theory that as a increases, the product total value
decreases. More difficult to forecast analytically is instead whether
the value maximizing the product is higher or lower in the case
of a higher value. Our analysis has been carried out on the basis
of three values, one simulating a situation of low competition
(0.1), one an intermediate level (0.5), and one referring to high
competition levels (0.9).
In the Appendix are to be found the graphs (Graphs 1, 2, 3)
resulting from the three different competition levels. They show
how, as α increases, product n · b strongly decreases. It can also
be seen as the level of taxation maximizing the target function
decreases with the increase of competition, but in a different way.
Namely, it is equal to 0.36 in the case of the lowest competition
level, goes down to 0.25 in the intermediate situation and is equal
to 0.24 with the stiffest competition. Such a performance shows
that as α increases, government policy is less and less effective,
given that the profit levels of innovating enterprises are very low.
For this reason, private companies will not be much interested in
investing on applied research and the government, in its turn, will
have less inducement, as well as lower resources, to carry out
basic research.
Another parameter influencing the function at hand is A
max
t   .
It is possible to see what happens when employing a lower
parameter than the one used in the previous analysis. The graph
in the addendum (Graph 4) shows the results of the function
11
with a parameter equal to 0.7. It can be seen that, as the starting
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10 The possible values for τ are those ranging from 0 to 1, but the values higher
than 0.7 have been ignored because they are meaningless in real terms.
11 The comparison is with the results in Graph 1, where At
max = 1,6.level of knowledge decreases, there is also a decrease of the
effectiveness of basic research on growth, which requires a higher
tax rate. In this way, an economic system starting from lower
technological levels must undergo higher costs in order to improve
its situation.
To  conclude, we can take into consideration the parameters
that show the productivities of the two types of research. To make
the analysis easier, it is possible to assume a relation between λ
and ψ, perhaps considering the one as being twice as much as the
other. In this way, it will be possible to assess the consequences
on the product of the combined change of the two parameters.
Supposing the doubling of the parameters at hand with respect
to the starting point, the efficacy of the policy is similar to the
one obtained before, but the same results require now a lower tax
rate. It comes out that, in the case of greater productivity by both
basic and applied research, the government can apply a lower
amount of taxes in order to carry out its policy. The outcome is
in Graph 5 in the Appendix.
To  sum up, the results coming out from the simulation show
that the effectiveness of government public policy depends on
market conditions. The higher the competition among businesses,
the lower the efficacy of public policy. As for leading-edge
technology, it has just a scarce influence on government policy.
However, it has to be considered that the lower the level of the
leading-edge technology, the higher the taxation costs for
enterprises. Finally, the possibility of success of research, both basic
and applied, influences not so much government policy as the need
of resources to invest. For this reason, if research has more
opportunities to be successful, a lower tax rate will suffice to obtain
similar results. In this way, the government can obtain excellent
results with no need to draw too many resources from businesses.
5. - Conclusions
In this work we have analysed the possible consequences of
the promotion of basic research by the government. In particular,
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model financed through the taxation of monopoly profits of
innovating enterprises.
The main results obtained can be summarized as follows. First
of all, it is possible to notice some Barro effects. Namely, using
as a proxy of economy growth rate the product of the number of
researchers in private research and those employed in public
research, growth effects depend on the tax rate
12. If the tax rate
is equal to zero, there is no innovation. Likewise, tax rate levels
around one can greatly reduce the resources employed in private
research, leading to no innovation in the economy. Such extremity
of the two effects grants the ideal level of the tax rate which
maximizes economic growth.
Secondly, through the numerical simulation of the model
results, we have been able to analyze the performance of the target
function as market features change.
The most interesting outcome is the effect of competition on
economic growth. Our model shows that a high level of
competition between the various enterprises implies a low level of
efficaciousness by government policy. This is in line with a
commonly held position in the specific literature, starting with
Schumpeter (1942), who underlines the dynamic efficiency of
monopoly in stimulating innovation. This emphasizes how it is
important to lead a valid patent policy, which generates monopoly
rights with the aim of stimulating innovation itself. It is important
to notice that the model, in line with Schumpeter view of creative
destruction, does not mean the association of technological
innovation with the persistence of monopolies. Monopoly profits
granted by patents are a sort of prize, which is by the way obtained
by always new enterprises. The field must be open to possible new
competitors that challenge existing monopolies. Possible
competition in the field of research and development must
therefore be promoted. To make opportunities fair and equal for
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12 This is obviously for given levels of the other parameters of economy, such
as, for instance, the elasticity of the demand curve for monopolists, success rates
of basic and applied research or the total number of the population in the economy.new competitors, would be advisable to remove any obstacle to
their entrance, such as, for example, possible problems in the
credit market.
Thirdly, concerning leading-edge technology, it has been
shown that it has little influence on government policy. Finally,
the possibility, both of basic and applied research, of being
successful, has more influence on the amount of resources to be
employed than on the effectiveness of government policy.
Specifically, the greater the possibility for research of being
successful, the smaller the tax rate needed to achieve positive
results.
Considering the effects of basic research on applied research,
a distinction is necessary between the effects on productivity and
the effects on levels. As for the first effect, it turns out that the
finding of an innovation in a given sector makes its productivity
develop discontinuously in the direction of the technological
frontier. It moves upward as basic research grows, so it can be
said that government policy effect on basic research productivity
is a positive one.
The level of applied research deserves to be treated separately.
Basic research has a negative effect on the level of applied
research. This can be explained by considering the peculiar kind
of financing of basic research by the government. Considering
basic research directly linked to a tax policy proportionally
influencing monopoly profits of enterprises, determines negative
effects on the inducement to innovate, and therefore on the
expenses on research, in the private sector.
To conclude, it has to be considered that the maximization of
growth does not necessarily lead to the higher level of social
welfare. Namely, social usefulness is given not only by the capacity
of economy to innovate, but also by the levels of consumption. In
models of this type, innovation occurs on the detriment of
consumption, so that in the short run it is possible to have a stage
of intense growth characterized by low consumption. With the
passing of time, the results are balanced, as growth behaves as a
multiplying factor for consumption.
Such results are plausible from an economic point of view.
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in order to take over a technological gap, the decision is made to
focus on the capacity to innovate, even to the detriment of social
welfare in the short run.
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